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Financial markets are very important sources of corporate finance and corporate
governance in the United States. Public and private markets for debt and equity securities
issued by corporations outstrip the amount of financing provided directly by financial
intermediaries by a wide margin. Hundreds of firmschange hands each year on the stock
market, many without the consent of incumbent management (i.e., via hostile takeovers).
The influence of employees on matters of corporate governance is very diffused, exercised
primarily through union representation and a limited amount of employee ownershipof equity
in pension or personal savings plans.
Capital allocation and corporate governance practices in Germany differ substantially
from the U.S. model. German universal banks remain central to the provision of corporate
finance to firms of all sizes. These banks lend directly to firms, take equity stakes under
certain circumstances, and provide underwriting services to firms issuing debt or equity
securities into the public market. Meanwhile, corporate debt and equity markets remain very
small in relation to the size of the German economy. Corporate governance is dominated by
universal banks and by non-bank block shareholders. Management and control changes
tend to be arranged behind closed doors, often by the banks or other blockholders, rather
than being carried out through a stock market takeover. In stark contrast to the U.S., there
have been only a handful of hostile takeovers in Germany since WWII. Also in contrast to the
U.S., many German employees have a significant direct voice in strategic corporate decision-
making in addition to union representation and employee stock ownership.
Why do the corporate governance systems of these two economically advanced
countries differ so much? What control mechanisms are present in Germany that are not in
the U.S.? What empirical research has been done on these topics? This article attempts to
answer these questions.
OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GERMANY
The two most distinctive institutional features of corporate governance in Germany1
are the extensive role of big universal banks and the strong influence of workers on corporate
decision-making. Universal banks lend to firms, underwrite shares, hold equity positions, act
as market makers at the exchange, sit on corporate boards, and exercise proxy votes for2
shares owned by others.2 These banks are undeniably powerful actors in the German
economy and they have no parallel in the U.S. Even those who argue in favor of repealing
the Glass-Steagall prohibition on the mixing of commercial and investment banking in the
U.S. would likely shy away from granting any set of institutions the powers and privileges
exercised by German universal banks. Appendix A provides some historical background on
universal banking in Germany.
The second important distinctive feature of German corporate governance is the
strong voice of workers in corporate affairs, institutionalized by laws concerning
Mitbestimmung, or codetermination. It is not well known outside Germany that workers are
guaranteed seats on many corporate boards by codetermination laws. Every large German
corporation must reserve fifty percent of the seats on its supervisory board (board of
directors) for employee representatives. In a few cases, employee representatives also hold
seats on a stock corporations’s management board (committee of the top executives). This
type of widespread representation of workers’ interests in corporate decision-making is
unknown in the U.S. Appendix B describes the three forms of codetermination in Germany.
Universal banking and codetermination have common origins. Both are state or
quasi-state institutional means of coordinating individual activities and of achieving social
consensus. Although both universal banking and codetermination have profound
implications for the allocation of private control and property rights, only codetermination
derives its legitimacy and concrete form from statute.
The case of universal banks is more subtle. The major universal banks are privately
owned, but they are sometimes described as quasi-state institutions. First, they are
exempted from some forms of market discipline. In particular, they are widely perceived to be
both “too-big-to-fail” and “too-important-to-be-taken-over.” Second, universal banks are
expected (and commonly said) to act with the public and/or national interest in mind rather
than strictly seeking to maximize profits or some other narrow financial measure.
How would anglo-american and German corporate governance systems operate if
they existed side-by-side in aagiven country? Despite virtually unhindered flows of capital3
and labor among developed countries, there are surprisingly few instances in which the
corporate control systems of these two different economic traditions come into direct contact.
One exception to this rule occurred recently in the context of a (rare) takeover battle in
Germany.
During the spring of 1997, Fried. Krupp AG Hoesch-Krupp (“Krupp”), one of
Germany’s largest steel and engineering companies, launched a hostile takeover bid for
Thyssen AG (“Thyssen”), its main competitor. The takeover attempt was financed by
Deutsche Morgan Grenfell and Kleinwort Benson, the London-based investment bank
subsidiaries of Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, respectively (two of the three
Grol3banken). The soon-to-be CEO of Deutsche Bank, Rolf Breuer, publicly likened this
takeover battle to a test of whether anglo-saxon style takeovers are feasible in Germany.
Strikes and demonstrations of furious Thyssen workers followed. The conservative
German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, expressed his “deep concern” over this matter and asked
the parties to “live up to their social responsibilities.” Public outrage culminated in a
demonstration outside Deutsche Bank headquarters in Frankfurt. Deutsche Bank, the largest
bank in Germany and financial advisor to Krupp, backed down.4
Bank leaders expressed frustration with what they called inconsistent public criticism.
For years, the big German banks had been bashed for hampering the development of capital
markets that would function in the anglo-saxon fashion. Yet now, when they attempted to use
German financial markets for one of its best-suited purposes— effecting a rapid change in
corporate control— they faced renewed criticism. If Germany is to have well-developed
“anglo-saxon style” capital markets, they argued, all parties must accept the proposition that a
principal outcome of stock market trading is to allow involuntary changes in corporate control.
This mechanism enhances firm efficiency and may be the greatest contribution stock
markets can make to overall economic efficiency (Manne, 1965). Appendix C provides
further details on this takeover battle.
PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS IN THE U.S. ANDGERMANY
To understand these institutional features of corporate governance in Germany, and
to appreciate how different they are from the anglo-saxon tradition, we must take a look back
into the intellectual histories of Germany and the English-speaking world. In Wealth of
Nations (1776), Adam Smith (1723-1790) argued in favor of a society based on individual
decision-making which, coordinated by the invisible hand, would ensure the social optimum.
Smith saw little need for central government planning:
The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform
which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper
performance of which no human wisdomor knowledge could ever be sufficient;
the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it
towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the society. (Book 4,
Chapter 9).
Although his writings circulated in Germany, Smith’s worldview never really caught on
there. Instead, Germans (as well as most other continental Europeans) have been more
strongly influenced by the German philosopher, G.F.W. Hegel (1770-1831).5
In Philosophy ofRight (1821), Hegel agreed with Smith that markets turn “subjective
selfishness into a contribution towards the satisfaction of the need of everyone else.” In
contrastto Smith, however, Hegel was pessimistic about some aspects of the outcome of
unfettered market operations. Hegel predicted that unrestrained market exchanges would
produce a class caught in a spiral of poverty.3 Hegel called for a system of social contracts
thatwould complement individuals’ market transactions by collective bargaining
arrangements and elements of central planning. As the provider of such a framework, the
State should be a means towards the manifestation of the “common will.” The principle
underlying all of the institutions envisioned by Hegel— and rejected by Smith— is that the
market should be guided and controlled in order to ensure that every individual is treated
fairly in his or her transactions with “society as a whole.”
Hegel’s ideas continue to influence thinking in Germany to this day. The Hegelian
concept of a market economy with a social component is enshrined in the modern German
constitution, which proclaims that the Federal Republic is to be a Soziale Marktwirtschaft, or
“social market economy.” Market mechanisms are often viewed with suspicion in Germany,
their results being regarded as chaotic, risky and unfair. As a result, numerous social
contracts, such as the state-run pay-as-you-go pension system and collective industry-wide
wage agreements, substitute for or complement market outcomes. These social contracts
coordinate individual activities towards the “common will” and reduce the individual’s
idiosyncratic risks.
Hegel’s influence extends to contemporary business practices in Germany. Writing in
a survey of corporate control in Germany, Ellen Schneider-Lenné (1992)— who, until her early
death in 1996, was a member of the management board of Deutsche Bank— describes the
appropriate objectives of a German firm:
The objectives of German companies, however, do not stop at maximization of
the return on investment. Their philosophy is based on ‘the concept of the
interest of the company as a whole,’ a key concept of German corporate culture.6
The company is seen as a combination of various groups whose goals have to be
coordinated. The company’s prime objective is doubtless the survival over the
long run. Alongside this, however, the long-term interests of its employees,
customers, suppliers, and the general public have also to be taken into
consideration. The creation and maintenanceof jobs with attractive working
conditions has special priority. There is also a growing sense of responsibility
towards the environment. In Germany the enterprise is considered to be
embedded in society, and since it profits from society it also has obligations
towards it. This commitment is rooted in the German constitution which says that
ownership entails obligations.
The widely varying conflicts of interest that can arise between individual groups within
the company and outside are usually resolved by compromise. One might, therefore,
call it a ‘consensus model’ (p. 16).
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CORPORATE
CONTROL SYSTEMS IN GERMANY
This section provides an overview of the institutional framework within which internal
and external control mechanisms are exercised in Germany. Internal control mechanisms
include a firm’s bylaws and the powers exercised by shareholders at the annual meeting, as
well as the two-tier board system that is designed to guide the firm on a daily basis and to
provide an early-warning system when problems and threats arise. External control
mechanisms include product market competition, political, legal, and regulatory controls, and
the capital markets, primarily the stock market. Large block shareholders and universal
banks are the two most prominent stakeholder groups that effectively span the internal and
external control environment. The next section of this article examines how well these key
stakeholders perform their corporate governance functions.7
Internal Control Systems: Annual Shareholder Meetings
The most basic internal control mechanism of any publicly traded firm is the annual
shareholder meeting. This is the only occasion on which the management team is obliged to
listen to shareholders’ views and to answer their questions. It is the only vestige of
democracy in modern corporate governance. However, very few small shareholders vote at
annual meetings, calling into question the ability of this control mechanism to provide
appropriategovernance of corporate decisions.
The most important outcome of the annual shareholder meeting is the election of
supervisory board members, who function as the shareholders’ representatives throughout
the rest of the year. Other important decisions made at this time include the possibility of
offering new shares for sale as well as what fraction of the year’s profit to retain and what
fraction to pay out as dividends.
Shareholders in Germanywho do not plan to attend the annual meeting are allowed
to transfertheir voting rights to someone else, either a natural person or an institution. Small
shareholders and blockholders alike make use of this right to designate a proxy (a “stand-in”)
to vote their shares. Blocks held by individuals are frequently voted by bank executive
directors or other trusted individuals. Also, some blocks owned by foreign governments are
regularly voted by German banks. Most small shareholders who bother to vote designate
either a bank or a shareholder association (an organization pledging to safeguard small
shareholders’ interests) to be their proxy.
Legally, shareholders may transfertheir voting rights to any person or institution.
Universal banks have a competitive advantage over other parties in obtaining proxy voting
powers, however. This is because universal banks provide the vast majority of retail
brokerage services in Germany and most equity shares are in bearer form (i.e., anonymous
as opposed to being registered with the company issuing them, as in the U.S.). Shareholders
typically need custodial services to safeguard their shares, and custody is a basic banking
business. It is a smallstep in the minds of most retail shareholders to transfertheir voting8
rights to the bank that physically holds their shares. The banks also hold an informational
advantage by knowing who owns shares in the first place.
Authority for bank proxy voting must be granted by shareholders in writing and must
be renewed at least once every 15 months. Shareholders may revoke their prior
authorization at any time in writing. The bank must mail the upcoming agenda to
shareholders in advance of the annual meeting, indicating how the votes will be cast unless
otherwise instructed by the shares’ owner. Unless a shareholder replies with explicit voting
instructions, the bank votes the shares as it previously indicated it would.4 Only about three
percent of the shareholders who use bank proxy voting give such instructions (Kärber, 1989).
Proxy voting by banks was severely criticized by the government’s antitrust
commission when it examined competition in the German economy (Monopolkommission,
1978). The commission determined that banks controlled at least five percent of the votes at
the 1975 annual meetings of 56 out of the 100 largest stock corporations
(Monopolkommission, 1978). In these 56 cases, banks cast about 50 percent of the votes at
the annual meetings by virtue of their proxy voting alone. In 30 cases, banks cast over 50
percent of the votes when counting both their own shares and the proxy votes they controlled;
in eleven cases, banks cast between 25 and 50 percent of the votes; and in 15 cases, banks
cast between five and 25 percent of the votes. Similarly, Böhm (1992) confirms that banks
(primarily the then three large private universal banks, Deutsche, Dresdner and
Commerzbank) dominated many shareholder meetings in 1986.
Voting patterns at the annual meetings of the banks themselves epitomise the danger
that proxy voting may create disenfranchised shareholders. Based on data from 1986
shareholder meetings, Gottschalk (1988) reports that if the three large universal banks had
voted together as a block— including both their own and the shares they voted in proxy—, they
would have commanded a majority of the votes at each bank’s annual meeting. This was
true despite the fact that none of the banks itself owned more than a trivial amount of shares
in either of the other two. It must also be stated that the banks do not actively compete for9
proxy votes; these are merely a byproduct of their large branch and retail brokerage
networks, as noted before.
Table 1 shows that shareholder representation at annual meetings of large firms with
dispersed ownership is low and declining, even though proxy voting is available. For
example, the fraction of outstanding shares actually voted at the 1994 annual meeting of
Schering, a pharmaceutical company without a large blockholder, was a mere 36.7 percent.
Internal ControlSystems: The Two-TierBoard System
German stock corporations operatewith a two-tier board system. The Aufsichtsrat, or
supervisory board (board of directors), consists of shareholder representatives and worker
representatives in fixed proportions. This board consists of non-executive directors (in
contrast to U.S. practice, where executives often dominate the board of directors), although
the chairman is often a former CEO. The supervisory board typically meets two to four times
a year in order to oversee the second-tier Vorstand, or management board, a committee
composed of the firm’s top current executives.
Shareholder representatives on the supervisory board are normally elected at the
annual meeting for a term of four years. In some cases, however, blockholders have the right
to directly appoint supervisory board members. Reappointments are permissable for both
supervisory board and management board members.
German supervisory boards are strongly influenced by the presence of worker
representatives (employees and labor union executives), who are guaranteed seats by
codetermination laws. Table 2 illustrates the board composition of the 100 largest firms in
Germany. The number of board seats held by private banks has been declining in recent
years. This is in part a response to public criticism of “excessive accumulation of power” by
banks through board representation in excess of their direct ownership of stock. It should be
noted however, that bankers are often nominated to serve on supervisory boards by the firms
themselves.10
The chairman of the management board functions as the firm’s CEO. The
supervisory board appoints the members of the management board for a term of up to five
years. Major decisions of the management board typically require the supervisory board’s
approval.
External Control Systems: The Legal Environment
No corporate governance system can function without legal protections of investors’
property rights. More specifically, the rights to own and dispose of equity shares in a firm and
to vote on corporate matters that may affect the value of an owner’s investment are
fundamental to a well-functioning capitalist economy.
Several aspects of the legal environment in Germany are inimical to shareholders’
rights, reducing the effectiveness of external control mechanisms such as the stock market.
Instead of reviewing the perennial and widely recognized problems created by Germany’s
high tax rates, restrictive labor laws, and other essentially macroeconomicdistortions, we
focus on three microeconomic features of the legal environment: codetermination laws,
voting restrictions, and the existence of shares with multiple votes. The common
denominator in the latter two institutional features is a deviation from the one-share-one-vote
principle that underlies the efficiency and legitimacy of corporate governance arrangements
(Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988).
Codetermination laws are a critical aspect of the legal environment in Germany. This
is because they impinge on shareholders’ basic rights to exercise voting control over the
firm’s assets. It is usually thought that those who bear the residual risks of a firm’s
performance— the equity owners— should be able to make the key decisions that contribute to
those outcomes. Codetermination partially unbundles residual control rights from residual
cash flow rights. These laws allow employees to influence corporate decision-making in
ways that may conflict with the interests of shareholders.
A second category of legal infringement of the property rights of shareholders in
Germany is the existence of voting restrictions in corporate charters. A voting restriction is a11
ceiling on the share of total votes that a blockholder is allowed to cast at the annual meeting,
regardless of the investor’s share of contributed capital. A typical limit is between five and 25
percent of the total votes outstanding. Any investor who holds a block larger than the ceiling
amount effectively loses normal voting rights on the shares in excess of the ceiling. Of
course, this means that the blockholder’s stake provides less than one vote per share on
average, and all other shareholders correspondingly receive more than one vote per share.
The first voting restrictions were introduced by Germany’s Federal Government in the
course of privatizing Volkswagenwerk in 1960. Initially, the limit was set at two percent but
later it was raised to 20 percent (in 1970). ~ Voting restrictions enjoyed some popularity after
the first oil price shock in the 1970s when investors from the Middle East began acquiring
blocks in German firms. A common fear at the time was that these foreign investors would
take control of blue chip firms. Presumably, this loss of domestic control would lead to some
harm to the nation’s vital interests. As of October 1997, nine out of 800 traded firms had
voting restrictions of some kind (HoppenstedtAktienführer 1998, 1997). It should be noted
that both of the recent successful hostile takeovers in Germany succeeded despite the
presence of voting restrictions.6
The third pertinent feature of the legal environment in Germany is the prevalence of
shares with multiple votes. The stock corporation law does not allow the issuance of such
shares today, but firms with existing shares with multiple votes have not been forced to
convert them into ordinary shares. These shares (preferred voting stock) are not traded at
the stock exchange; they are a way for large shareholders to retain control over the firm
without increasing their investment in the firmswhen new shares are issued. As in the two
cases already discussed, shares with multiple votes effectively deprive other investors of the
voting power their shares would command in a one-share-one-vote regime.
A prominent example of shares with multiple votes is provided by Siemens AG, where
the founding family recently held a 5.29 percent stake in the common stock, but had a 100
percent stake in preferred voting stock (as of October 1996). This preferred voting stock
gives the family holders six votes per share on issues specified in the charter. Thus,12
allthough the overall investment of the family amounts to only 6.94 percent of the capital, the
family controls 14.03 percent of the votes on these special issues.
External Control Systems: The Stock Market
The stock market disciplines a publicly traded firm’s management by pricing the firm’s
overall performance. Moreover, it is the stock market where control over the firm is traded. In
principle, the stock market auctions every firm’s assets each day to the team of investors and
managers that believes it can create the most value by using them.
Are there alternatives to the stock market as an external control mechanism? The
product market (that is, how successful the firm is in selling its products and services)
provides an important input for the stock market evaluation process rather than providing an
efficient substitute for it. This is because discipline of a firm by the product market alone is
likely to be very slow in coming and quite disruptive— i.e., culminating in bankruptcy— when it
does occur (Townsend, 1979; Gale and Hellwig, 1985; Jensen, 1993). Bankruptcy in turn
leads to a shift of control from shareholders to bondholders, who may not be the best parties
to run the firm (Aghion and Bolton, 1992).
This section describes several important features of the German stock market in
terms of its ability to function as an external corporate control system. In particular, we
discuss the historically limited scope of the stock market in Germany, the extent and nature of
shareholder concentration, the scarcity of hostile takeovers, the role of the pay-as-you-go
private pension system in retarding financial market development, the role of mutual funds,
and finally, the importance of cross shareholdings and pyramid ownership structures.
Role of the stock market. Stock markets have traditionally been of little importance as a
corporate control mechanism in Germany. There were 686 stock-exchange traded
corporations in Germany at year-end 1956, with total market value equal to 11.6 percent of
GDP. At the same time, there were 2,969 traded firms in the U.S. with market capitalization
of eight percent of GDP (Securities and Exchange Commission, 1958, pp. 62, 228). By the
end of 1995, there were 802 traded stock corporations in Germany with total market value13
equal to 24 percent of GDP (Deutsche BOrse AG, 1997). In the U.S., on the other hand,
some 8,027 traded firms accounted for a market capitalization equivalent to 105 percent of
GDP (Wall Street Journal, 1998, pp. 395-7). Appendix D provides further details on the
German stock market.
By way of contrast, assets held by the banking sector are relatively more important in
Germany than in the U.S. The assets of the banking sector (not including the central bank)
amounted to 297 percent of GDP in 1960 and 234 percent in 1996. The corresponding
figures for the U.S. were 66 percent in 1960 and 78 percent in 1996.
Shareholder concentration. One important feature of the German stock market is the
prevalence of large blockholders, that is, individuals, families, orfirms that hold a high
percentage of the outstanding stock of a single traded firm. Blockholders are quite important
for controlling firms’ managers because concentrated ownershipmitigates the free-rider
problem that afflicts firms with many small shareholders, none of whom has strong incentives
to monitor the management. An alternative to concentrated ownership is the presence of a
delegated monitor who represents dispersed owners, such as a universal bank armed with
the power to vote small shareholders’ stakes in proxy.
While mandatory disclosure of shareholdings over five percent of the outstanding
equity has existed in Germany only since 1995, earlier estimates of block ownership (such as
the HoppenstedtAktienführei) were reasonably accurate (if known only after a lag), since
blockholders’ stakes were revealed when voting at annual meetings.7 Table 3 provides
information on the identity of the largest blockholders in German firms based on Hoppenstedt
data as of September 30, 1993, as used in Gorton and Schmid (1998a).
Table 3 shows that only nine out of 198 large German firms (4.5 percent) had no
blockholders at all (that is, all shares were dispersed among small shareholders). Of the 189
firms with blockholders, 165 firms had at least one blockholder with a stake of 25 percent or
more. Some 125 firms (63 percent of the sample) had a blockholder with at least 50 percent
of the equity, and 61 firms (31 percent) had a blockholder with a share of at least 75 percent.14
This high level of shareholder concentration in Germany exceeds that in the U.S. and some
other countries by a wide margin (Franks and Mayer, 1994, p. 7).
As noted above, universal banks also hold blocks. However, banks are relatively
unimportant as blockholders on average. Individuals or familiesas well as non-financial firms
are more important blockholders. Gorton and Schmid (1 998a) found that only 39 of the 198
firms in their sample (20 percent) counted a bank among their blockholders, and these blocks
were smaller than typical blocks when they did exist. In only three firms did a bank hold a
block of 50 percent or more. Table 4 provides details on the equity stakes held by the ten
largest banks in all German corporations. The table shows that, while the number of firms in
which banks hold equity positions has increased over the last decade, there has been a
decline in the frequency with which these stakes give banks outright control or a blocking
minority position. Restricting our viewto traded firms only, the bottom part of Table 4 shows
that banks’ equity stakes have actually been falling in recent years (from 46 to 30). As was
true for the set of corporations as a whole, banks’ equity stakes in traded firms are
increasingly those of a minority shareholder when they exist at all.8
Similar conclusions emerge when looking at overall bank equity ownership patterns
(i.e., counting all shares owned, not just those in large blocks). The ten largest private banks
held only 1 .3 percent of the face value of corporate equity in 1976, while in 1994, this number
was a mere 0.4 percent (Bundesverband deutscher Banken; http:llwww.bdb.de).9
Hostile takeovers. Only a few hostile takeovers have occurred in post-WWII Germany and
there has never been a management-led leveraged buyout (LBO). 10 One reason for the
relative inactivity of the market for corporate control in Germany is the unusually small
number of listed firms in comparison to the size and vitality of its economy. However, there
are two other (not mutually exclusive) explanations that have been suggested. First,
takeovers by means of stock market transactions may be more costly in Germany. Taxes,
legal and regulatory impediments, and other transactions costs are significant in Germany
(see Appendix E for a description of recent reform efforts). Second, control mechanisms
other than stock market takeovers may be more effective in removing corporate inefficiency in
Germany. Universal banks and other large investors may be able to execute restructurings15
and control transfers behind the scenes at lower cost than is possible on the stock market.
Takeovers may create costs for many “stakeholders” in the affected firms, some of which are
not taken into account by the parties who initiate the change in control (Shleifer and
Summers, 1988).
Private pension system. One factor that contributes to the underdevelopment of the
German stock market is the rather undeveloped nature of the private pension system. Most
importantly, private pensions (Betriebsrente) are provided voluntarily by only some of the
larger firms. Only about 50 percent of currently employed workers in western Germany will
receive private pensions, and virtually no workers in eastern Germany can expect private
pension benefits (Bayerische Landesregierung, 1995). Second, private pension payments
typically represent a supplement of only about ten to 30 percent on top of a typical retiree’s
pension from the state-run system. Finally, Germany’s private pensions are overwhelmingly
provided on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis. While this financing principle applies to public
old-age and disability insurance systems around the world, it also applies to corporate
pensions in Germany (Schneider-Lenné, 1992). Instead of paying contributions for
employees’ pensions into a separate pension fund, German employers merely make
provisions on their balance sheets. Only current pension obligations require current
expenditures. Of course, this means that accrual of future pension liabilities provides a
source of financing (cash flow) for current corporate activities.
In a fully funded pension system, on the other hand, increases in future pension
liabilities must be matched with current cash outlays to purchase pension assets, usually
long-term financial assets like stocks and bonds. The PAYG nature of private pension
provision in Germany therefore has two effects, both of which reduce the importance of
markets for long-term financial assets. First, pension provisioning on the balance sheet
reduces the demand for financial assets to fund pensionholders’ accounts. Instead,
pensionholders receive non-securitized claims on their employers. Second, the ability to
effectively finance current operations by increasing pension liabilities reduces firms’ supply of
long-term financial assets to the market. Consequently, a country like Germanywith a PAYG16
private pension system will have a smaller capitalization of stock and bond markets along
with lower trading volumes.
Investment funds. Another retarding factor in the German stock market environment has
been the late start of mutual fund investing, a convenient and low-cost way for households to
accumulate long-term financial assets. As late as 1960, investment funds’ holdings of stock
were essentially zero. By 1990, this figure had risen to 4.3 percent of stock market
capitalization and it had increased further to 7.5 percent by 1995. The fact that mutual funds
have grown this fast in recent years indicates that German households are concerned that
the state-run pension system will not be able to provide the level of pension payments in the
future that it did in the past. Of course, we cannot say for sure whether the growth of stock
mutual funds means that households have increased their overall holdings of stock relative to
other investments. Official statistics do not reveal all indirect holdings of stock, including
shares held by the public sector, by firms other than stock corporations, and by foreign
investors. Some portion of these holdings will benefit individuals through indirect means.
Based on direct ownership data, the fraction of domestic shares held by domestic
households fell from 31.8 percent in 1960, to 16.9 in 1990, and further to 14.6 in 1995. Other
shareholder categories are nonfinancial firms, financial firms, the public sector and foreign
investors. Since it is not known what fraction of stock is owned by firms other than stock
corporations (i.e., closely held firms, which may be indistinguishable from households), the
fraction of stock directly or indirectly owned by households remains unknown.11
Cross shareholdings. A cross shareholding is an equity position one firm holds in another
firm. It is possible for a web of cross shareholdings to exist in which firmA holds equity in
firm B, which holds equity in firm C, which, in turn, holds an equity stake in firm A. It may be
difficult or impossible for an outsider to make a takeover bid or even to acquire a significant
stake in a firm the shareholder structure of which is enmeshed in a complex cross
shareholding arrangement.
The most significant cross shareholding structure in Germany is centered on Allianz
AG, the holding company of Europe’s largest insurance group. This network of cross17
shareholdings encompasses several other important financial firms, including Munich Re, the
world’s largest reinsurance company, and both Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, two of
the largest German banks. The most common size of the stakes held in this network are of
five, ten, or 25 percent of the the target’s equity. Some cross shareholdings were eliminated
recently as a result of the merger of Bayerische Vereinsbank and Bayerische Hypotheken-
und Wechsel-Bank, each of which comprised nodes in the Munich-based network
surrounding Allianz.
It is likely that more cross shareholdings will be eliminated in Germany (and in Europe
as a whole) as the financial services sector consolidates. It has long been said that one of
the purposes of cross shareholdings was to prepare for and facilitate consolidation. This is
particularly likely to be true in the case of cross-border cross shareholdings within Europe.
Pyramids. Pyramids are a particular form of interfirm shareholding arrangement in which
firmA holds a stake in firm B, which holds a stake in firm C. The distinguishingcharacteristic
of a pyramid arrangement is that firm Ai sattempting to maximize its control over firm C while
minimizing its financial investment in firm C, either directly or indirectly. Hence, a broad base
of assets is controlled by a narrow pinnacle of equity investment. For example, if firmA holds
a stake of slightly more than 50 percent in firm B, which in turn owns slightly more than 50
percent of the votes in firm C, then firmA can effectively exercise control over firm C with just
over 25 percent indirect ownership of the voting stock of firm C. Without the pyramid
structure involving firm B, control over firm C would require firm A to hold more than a 50
percent direct investment.
There have been numerous cases of pyramiding among German firms. Some are
motivated by the desire to “disenfranchise” minority shareholders, but many appear to be
attempts to deal efficiently with more legitimate governance problems, such as joint ventures
or relationship-specific investments. 12
Joint ventures are sometimes organized as subsidiaries owned jointly by the parties to
the venture. A joint-venture subsidiary may in turn create other joint ventures, which are also
organized as subsidiaries. Minority shareholders may be invited to hold stakes in some of the18
subsidiaries not so that they may be expropriated by the majority or controlling firms, but in
order to promote cooperation at least cost to the ultimate organizers.
Another reason for pyramid-type interfirm shareholdings involves relation-specific
investments or commitments made by customers or suppliers. If agents transact repeatedly
at various stages of production, a pyramid may emerge as an effective way for a firm to
assure reliable supply or demand. In these cases, pyramiding is essentially a form of vertical
integration.
A case watched closely by German competition authorities involves RWE AG, the
largest utility in Germany. Local and regional administrative bodies in the state of North
Rhine-Westphalia held about 59 percent of the votes in RWE as of October 1997. Both
RWE and these public bodies are engaged in large-scale construction projects on an
ongoing basis. RWE owns a 56.1 percent stake in Hochtief AG, a construction firm (41.1
percent direct; 15 percent indirect). Furthermore, Hochtief holds a 24.9 direct stake in Philipp
Holzmann AG, one of its few significant competitors (plus an option to buy another 10 percent
stake held by Commerzbank AG). The motivationsfor RWE and the local authorities to build
this pyramid structure are not clear, nor are the competitive effects it may have in the
construction industry.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF UNIVERSAL BANKING AND
CODETERMINATION ON CORPORATE GOVERANCE
We now turn to the empirical evidence concerning universal banking and
codetermination as they affect corporate governance in Germany. As the previous section
made clear, both internal and external control mechanisms are available for guiding and
disciplining firms’ managements. The institutions of universal banking and codetermination
both shape and are shaped by the internal and external control environments in Germany.
Hence, sorting out cause and effect in the highly interrelated and complex system of
corporate governance in Germany (or any other country) is a formidable challenge.19
Before beginning our review, it is worthwhile pointing out how meagerthe available
empirical evidence on corporate governance in Germany actually is. There are only a few
rigorous quantitative studies that analyze the influence of universal banking or
codetermination on the performance of German firms. Those that exist are sometimes
handicapped by small or unrepresentative datasets. These shortcomings can be traced
directly to the paucity of readily available data on German firms’ financial structures.
Relatively few firms are publicly traded, and those that are do not face the type of disclosure
requirements common in the English-speaking world.
To be sure, there are many narrative studies based on anecdotal evidence; these go
back into the ~ century when Germany’s economic ascendance was first widely perceived
in Europe and the world. These studies have reached widely varying conclusions, however,
not least due to their often barely concealed ideological or political agendas. This is true both
within and outside Germany.13
The proliferation of conflicting viewpoints may have convinced some observers that
there is no hope of drawing solid conclusions regarding universal banks, codetermination, or
any of the other unique or controversial aspects of German corporate governance. We hope
to dispel some of the skepticism that surrounds these questions by reviewing recent empirical
work that begins to lay the foundation for reliable analysis.
Universal Banking
The first econometric analysis focusing on the influence of universal banks in
Germany was conducted by Cable (1985). Subsequently, studies by Edwards and Fischer
(1994), Franks and Mayer (1994), Kaplan (1994), Elston and Albach (1995), Schmid
(1 996a,b), Gorton and Schmid (1 998b), and others appeared. Without exception, sample
sizes in these studies are small by U.S. academic standards.
Universal banks, control structures, and firm performance. In a pioneering study, Cable
(1985) investigated the influence of universal banks on the performance of German firms by
analyzing a sample of 48 traded German companies. His observations were chosen from a20
list of the 100 largest German companies in 1974. It is revealing to note that this list became
available only because a government antitrust commission compiled the basic data and
published their results (Monopolkommission, 1978). There had been no comprehensive
publicly available source for even this rudimentary information previously.
Cable regressed financial performance on several characteristics of the firm’s
governance structure. Financial performance was measured with accounting data averaged
over the period 1968-1972. Explanatory variables drawn from the firm’s governance structure
included the concentration of shareholdings among investors in the firm (measured by a
Herfindahl index) and the fraction of votes exercised by banks at annual meetings in 1975,
among others. Votes controlled by banks included both the shares they owned and the proxy
votes they exercised for clients. The author also included several normalizing regressors,
such as industry dummy variables.
Cable found positive and significant influences of shareholder concentration and bank
voting power on firm performance. In other words, the more concentrated the ownership
among the firm’s shareholdings and the larger the proportion of votes cast at annual meetings
by banks, the better was a firm’s financial performance. These findings appeared to provide
strong evidence for a positive influence of universal banking on the performance of German
firms. Schmid (1996a) confirmed Cable’s qualitative results while arguing that Cable’s
original methodology was suspect.
Cable’s performance measure was flawed in two ways (Schmid, 1996a). Most
seriously, Cable’s observations of firm performance were for a time period before the firm’s
control structure was observed. The causal hypothesis being tested— that a firm’s control
structure affects its performance— requires precisely the reverse ordering. Thus, Cable’s
findings cannot be used to rule out the alternative hypothesis that it is good performance of
the firm that causes high levels of shareholder concentration and bank voting power.
Secondly, Cable’s performance measure is difficult to interpret because he neglects interest
expense, which is part of the return to the total capital resources of the firm. Cable used a
measure relating net income to total assets instead of using either net income divided by21
(book value of) equity (ROE, return on equity), or net income plus interest expense divided by
total assets.
Gorton and Schmid (1998b) provided additional evidence that German firms’ control
structures are systematically related to their financial performance. Combining Cable’s
dataset with anothercompiled by Böhm (1992), Gorton and Schmid examined the
relationship between several indicators of a firm’s control structure and three different
performance measures: ROE, ROA (return on assets), and the market-to-book ratio of equity
(MTB). Using 82 observations from 1975 and 56 observations from 1986, Gorton and
Schmid found that bank equity positions and shareholder concentration measures were
generally positively and statistically significantly related to firm performance. Although the
statistical significance of the relationship was not strong in every regression, the coefficients
were never significantly negative.
For example, the null hypothesis that bank proxy voting makes no difference to firm
performance could not be rejected in any of the specifications. On the other hand, Gorton
and Schmid (1998b) found that direct ownership of shares by banks was significantly
positively related to measures of market value. In particular, a one-percentage point
increase in the fraction of a firm’s shares held by banks was associated with an increase in
the market value of the firm’s equity of between 0.60 and 0.86 percent.
Gorton and Schmid (1 998b) used their dataset to investigate several other
hypotheses concerning universal banking and corporate governance. They found no
evidence of a change in the relationship between bank-dominated control structures and firm
performance between 1975 and 1986. They also found no evidence to indicate that universal
banks face serious conflicts of interest in carrying out their roles as lenders, shareholders,
and custodians (proxy voters) of small shareholders’ shares.
To test for conflicts of interest, Gorton and Schmid (1 998b) checked for nonlinearities
in the impact of shareholder concentration, the banks’ equity holdings and proxy voting on
firm performance. The presence of such nonlinearities could indicate a conflict of interest of
banks in their roles as equityholders and custodians of small shareholders’ votes. Under the22
conflict-of-interest hypothesis, the way banks use proxy votes depends on how much equity
they own in the firm in question. Nonbank blockholders may alter but not eliminate the bank’s
conflict of interest, so there will be another nonlinearity in the relationship. On the basis of
Gorton and Schmid’s results, one cannot reject the hypothesis of no conflict of interest.
Relatedly, Edwards and Fischer (1994) concluded that German banks do notuse the
proxy votes they control to install their own representatives on supervisory boards. They
reasoned from these results that banks do not act in the interests of small shareholders and
therefore are subject to a conflict of interest. However, Franks and Mayer (1994) and Gorton
and Schmid (1 998b) provided evidence contrary to the findings of Edwards and Fischer
(1994); that is, ownership does translate into supervisory board representation. Banks do not
appear to interfere with shareholder representation according to actual ownership. This
evidence to the contrary undermines the Edwards and Fischer argument, but cannot by itself
resolve the question of whether there is a conflict of interest between universal banks and
small shareholders.
How do universal banks affect firm performance? The bulk of the evidence reviewed
above points to a positive effect of universal bank involvement on firm performance; Edwards
and Fischer (1994) is the exception. These studies are very crude in one sense, however:
they merely test for a statistical relationship, rather than providing much economic insight into
what is taking place. A slightly different approach to the general question of the relationship
between universal banking and firm performance is to look for specific mechanisms or
channels through which universal banks may improve (or hinder) performance.
One strand of the corporate finance literature suggests that banking relationships may
improve firm performance because so-called “internal” capital markets buffer firmsfrom
shocks that reduce the efficiency of financial intermediation in “external” (public) markets.
Using evidence from Japan, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) concludedthat “main-
bank” relationships reduce firms’ costs of financial distress.
Elston and Albach (1995) reported evidence for Germany pointing to reduced liquidity
constraints when strong banking relationships were present. They compared a group of 2923
firms that had significant bank ownershipstakes in 1991 to another group of 92 firms without
a bank blockholder in the same year. Elston and Albach (1995) examined the periods 1967-
1972, 1973-1982, and 1983-1992, and found no liquidity constraints (defined as no
correlation between internally generated cash flow and investment expenditures) in the first
two subperiods for either group of firms. Finding a positive relationship in the latest subperiod
only for firms without a bank blockholder, they concluded that firms with close bank ties have
more reliable access to financial capital.
There are several problems with Elston and Albach’s results, however. Most
fundamentally, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) demonstrated that investment-cash flow
sensitivities do not have a strong theoretical or empirical basis as a measure of financing
constraints. Secondly, Elston and Albach make the inappropriate assumption that every
bank’s shareholding structure was invariant over the 25-year period they analyzed. Finally,
they erroneously classified one industrial company as a bank, contaminating their bank
ownership data.14
Is it universal banking or relationship banking that matters? A natural question to ask is
whether the positive influence on firm performance associated with a banking relationship
requires banks to operate as universal banks. Couldn’t a strictlycommercial banking
relationship ease liquidity constraints just as well? In fact, some writers suggest that the
traditional German Hausbank (house-bank) relationship is based on commercial rather than
investment banking activities (Fischer 1990).
Schmid (1996b) argued that universal banking enhances firm performance above and
beyond what commercial and investment banking can do separately. Using data for all 62
German stock corporations with bank shareholders at the end of 1990, Schmid found that
firm ROE displayed a U-shaped pattern when plotted against the level of bank equity
holdings. Underlying this pattern, Schmid found that a firm’s interest rate on debt was
monotonically increasing in bank equity holdings.
The logic of Schmid’s (1 996b) argument is that universal banks are able to price
commercial and investment banking services jointly, a strategy that is not feasible when24
commercial and investment banks provide their individual services independently. The
reason why cross-subsidization may be beneficial in this context is the existence of a free-
rider problem among shareholders. An individual shareholder who owns less than 100
percent of the equity would bear the full cost of monitoring but would receive benefits only in
proportion to the ownership stake. This drives a wedge between the privately optimal level of
monitoring and the socially optimal level, causing monitoring intensity to be too low.15
A bank that owns a small block will use an increase in voting power (associated with
increased ownership) to divert earnings away from equity. As the bank’s block becomes
larger, however, the bank stands to earn a higher fraction of the net (after interest) income
created by its active monitoring of firm management. This is why, at high levels of ownership,
the bank’s incentive to divert earnings away from equity declines with further increases in the
size of the block. Taken together, these considerations lead one to expect a U-shaped
relationship between a firm’s ROE and the level of bank equity ownership.
There are two factors determining the ability of the bank to translate higher voting
power into higher interest rates on bank debt. On the one hand, increasing the firm’s interest
burden increases the firm’s tax shield. On the other hand, banks cannot increase the firm’s
interest payments arbitrarily. Competition from other banks limits the interest rate that the
bank blockholder can impose on the firm. Taking these two effects into consideration, one
would expect a monotonically increasing interest rate as a function of bank equity
ownership.16
The large German universal banks have long been accused of “overcharging” for
loans (Hilferding, 1910). Modern corporate governance theory provides more subtle and
benign explanations of this phenomenon (for example, Rajan, 1992). The higher price
charged on loans by universal banks may be an efficient mechanism for internalizing the
benefits they create, but cannot capture, in their function as a delegated monitor for small
shareholders.
The empirical evidence reviewed in this section provides some insight into the method
and effectiveness of universal banking as a component of the German corporate governance25
system. However, these results are of limited use for cross-country comparisons. This is
because the importance and interrelationships of individual corporate control features vary
across different financial systems. Therefore, the conclusions one may draw from studies of
corporate governance in Germany do not necessarily apply to the U.S. or any other country.
Fortheoretical discussion of the merits of the U.S. and German financial systems, see
Hellwig (1991) or Allen and Gale (1995).
Codetermination
The first rigorous empirical research investigating the effects of codetermination on
firm performance was FitzRoy and Kraft (1 993)•17 Gorton and Schmid (1998a) and Schmid
and Seger (1998) provided additional evidence on this topic.
Codetermination and firm performance. FitzRoy and Kraft (1993) examined the impact of
the 1976 Codetermination Law on the productivity of 68 big German companies. Their
sample was chosen to include firms that were required by the new law to increase from one
third to one half the fraction of supervisory board seats occupied by worker representatives.
FitzRoy and Kraft (1993) estimated a translog production function to measure firm productivity
in both 1975 and 1983. The authors reasoned that these years represented the pre- and
post-legislation environments and similar stages of the business cycle.
FitzRoy and Kraft (1993) estimated that the introduction of equal representation by
worker representatives on supervisory boards reduced the ‘value added’ of the affected firms
by 19.7 percent.18 Moreover, the authors concluded that firm ROE declined by 5 percentage
points as a result of the legislation. This is a substantial reduction given that the sample
mean of ROE equaled only 9.3 percent in 1975.
Schmid and Seger (1998) analyzed a sample of 160 large traded stock corporations
observed in 1975, 1986, and 1991. The study exploited publicly available information on
bank proxy voting (as in Gorton and Schmid, 1 998b) and obtained 64 observations by
collecting the attendance lists from annual meetings. As in Cable (1985), Schmid and Seger
regressed a financial performance measure— the market-to-book ratio of equity (MTB)— on26
proxies for ownership and control characteristics as well as normalizing regressors such as
firm size and industry dummy variables. As in FitzRoy and Kraft (1993), Schmid and Seger
compared firms with equal representation to firms with one-third representation of workers on
the supervisory board. In contrast to FitzRoy and Kraft, Schmid and Seger did not compare
the pre- and post-legislation performance of a given firm but instead pooled their
observations and used year dummies and firm-specific control variables to isolate the effects
of codetermination.
Schmid and Seger (1998) measured the impact of codetermination by examining the
regression coefficient on a dummy variable that took the value one if the firm had more than
2,000 workers, and was therefore subject to the new law, or zero if the firm had not more than
2,000 workers and was not affected. The results suggested that equal representation causes
an eighteen percent decrease in share prices. In other words, shareholders would have been
willing to give up around 22 percent of the current value of their pre-legislation investment in
order to abrogate the Codetermination Law of 1976. This willingness to pay can be viewed
as the market price of the loss of control rights suffered by shareholders.
Why does codetermination affect firm performance? Whereas Schmid and Seger (1998)
estimated only how codetermination affected the market value of corporate control, Gorton
and Schmid (1998a) investigated the underlying causes and ultimate consequences of
codetermination in detail. Usinga pooled time-series cross-section approach covering the
250 largest traded stock corporations during the 1988-1993 period, the authors confirmed
that equal representation by workers on the supervisory board was associated with a
negative impact on the firm’s MTB, ROE, and ROA.
Gorton and Schmid (1998a) also found evidence that the participation of workers in
investment decisions decreases the variance of ROA. Holding all else equal, this reduces
the default probability of the firm. Because equity has limited liability (a put option on the
firm’s assets) but captures all positive deviations in firm returns, a lower variance of firm cash
flows lowers the market value of equity. Gorton and Schmid estimated that the market value
loss due to the introduction of equal board representation by workers was 12.2 percent, a bit
lower than Schmid and Seger’s (1998) estimate based on a smaller sample in different years.27
Gorton and Schmid (1998a) also analyzed the compensation structures of the
management board and the supervisory board. Earlier work by Kaplan (1994) had suggested
that shareholders were just about as active in controlling German firms as they were in the
U.S. Comparing 42 German firms with 146 U.S. and 119 Japanese companies over the
period 1981- 1989, Kaplan found that firm performance and executive turnover were
negatively related in all three countries (i.e., worse performance is associated with higher
executive turnover). Building on these results, Gorton and Schmid showed that the
compensation of both management board members and supervisory board members in
German firms is positively related to firm performance, just as it is in the U.S. Furthermore,
this pay-for-performance relationship is robust to changes in the underlying measure of firm
performance, encompassing ROA, ROE, and log of MTB. Gorton and Schmid estimated that
a one-percent increase in shareholder wealth raises the compensation of the management
board by about 0.05 percent.19
The positive link between firm performance and supervisory board compensation
documented by Gorton and Schmid (1998a) is surprising because only a few German firms
apply explicit performance-related compensation schemes for non-executive directors. As it
turns out, however, compensation appears to be implicitly performance-based. Gorton and
Schmid also found that the compensation scheme varies with the codetermination regime
that applies to the firm. The pay of non-executive directors is more sensitive to firm
performance when workers have equal board representation than when only one third of the
board is made up of worker representatives. Thus, it appears that shareholders provide
stronger incentives for board members to act in their (the shareholders’) interests when
workers are more heavily represented. Gorton and Schmid found that the pay of supervisory
board members rises by 0.19 percent with a one-percent increase in shareholder wealth
when workers have less than equal representation, while the pay-for-performance elasticity
is 0.34 when workers control one half of the supervisory board seats.
CONCLUSION
The corporate governance systems in Germany and the United States entail both
similarities and differences. Frequent changes in corporate control occur in Germany,28
averaging some 1,500 per year since the late 1980s (Bundeskartellamt, 1997). Likewise,
control changes are a frequent occurrence in the U.S., with some 35,000 merger and
acquisition events taking place in the U.S. during the 1976-90 period (Jensen, 1993, p. 837).
However, the predominant methods by which control changes take place appear to differ
between the two countries. Stock-market based control changes are frequent and
sometimes contentious in the U.S., while other forms of corporate control appear to operate
in Germany. Large blockholders exist in the vast majority of German firms, exerting strong
control over the management. Sales of large blocks of shares are common, although they
are seldom carried out directly through the stock market. Universal banks are often able to
exercise control in firms with dispersed ownership, that is, when no other blockholder exists,
by exploiting proxy voting authority granted by small shareholders.
Two distinctive features of the German corporate governance system are universal
banking and codetermination. These institutional features are important for understanding
the German system because they influence the ability of shareholders to exert control over
the management of the firms they own. Relatively little empirical evidence is available to help
in evaluating the effects of these institutions.
It is beyond the scope of this article to determine whether the German or U.S. system
of corporate governance is superior to the other in any sense. Control changes brought
about on stock markets or in the course of financial restructuring, as are common in the U.S.,
appear to generate value for shareholders. For example, Jensen (1993, p. 837) estimates
that shareholders in firms acquired over the period 1976-90 received gains of $750 billion
(expressed in terms of inflation-adjusted 1992 dollars). However, these control changes may
have been costly for other “stakeholders” in the affected firms, including employees,
communities, and bondholders (Shleifer and Summers, 1988).
More relevantto the German case, Jensen (1993, pp. 833-4) points out that the high
level of activity in U.S. takeover markets— a mechanism for exercising corporate control that is
externalto the firm— is evidence that internal control mechanisms have failed. The German
corporate governance system is oriented more toward internal than external mechanisms.29
Large blockholders and universal banks are central to the functioning of internal control
mechanisms. Thus, the lack of stock-market based takeover activity in Germany relative to
the U.S. does not constitute evidence for or against either governance system. More
research is needed to illuminate the underlying strengths and weaknesses of both systems of
corporate governance.30
APPENDIX A: UNIVERSAL BANKING IN GERMANY
Today’s four largest private German banks (Grol3banken) were established in 1869
(Bayerische Vereinsbank), 1870 (Deutsche Bank) and 1872 (Commerzbank and Dresdner
Bank). This was around the time when the German Reich was founded under Prussian
hegemony in 1871. It was the starting point of the Gründerjahre (“founding years”) period,





th centuries, Prussia transformed itself from a politically
meaningless, poverty-stricken dukedom into a military power of significant influence on the
European continent. It followed a mercantilistic tradition with the state functioning as central
planner and orchestratorfor the economy. At the same time, however, it allowed substantial
freedom for individual business and financial activities. When Germany was founded, the
same principles were applied to industrialize and modernize the economy.
Closing the economic and industrial gap with England was viewed as necessaryfor
the survival of the young state in the presence of strong neighboring militarypowers in the
west (France) and the east (Russia). The catch-up strategy involved establishing privately-
owned Grol3unternehmen (“great firms”) that at first simplycopied production processes
invented and first applied in England (see Chandler, 1990, on the strategies undertaken by
various nations to industrialize rapidly). These firms were set up to operate on a large scale
in order to serve the world market. Examples of Grol3unternehmen that soon innovated
production processes and outperformed their smaller British competitors (Chandler, 1990)
included BASF, Bayer and Hoechst, all of which were founded between 1863 and 1865.
Today, these firms rank among the largest chemical companies in the world.
The German Grol3banken (“great banks”) played a key role in financing German
industrialization. Although they were privately-owned, these banks were viewed (and viewed
themselves) as quasi-state institutions (Shonfield, 1965). They soon developed into universal
banks, conducting all lines of firm financing business. They lent to firms, underwrote
securities and held equity positions (either temporarily or over a longer term). While equity31
ownership gave these banks voting power, this was only one source of influence over
nonfinancial firms. The number of controlling stakes was not an accurate reflection of their
actual influence (Riesser, 1905). There were also many nonbank blockholders at that time
(Steinitzer, 1908). Adding to the influence of these banks was their presence on corporate
boards, their proxy voting of shares on behalf of small shareholders (sometimes without their
explicit consent), and their market-making role at the stock exchange (Riesser, 1905).
Given this accumulation of power, the key industries of the time were largely
controlled by a few GroI3banken (Jeidels, 1905). As Hilferding (1910) points out, banks
dominated all channels of external firm financing. Firms had no immediate access to the
capital market (i.e., without the assistance of the banks). The banks were also able to
influence firms’ conduct of business, to initiate mergers among them, and to build and control
industrial conglomerates.33
for which freedom of speech is central to their mission. In addition, stock corporations with
fewer than 500 employees that are owned by a family are also exempted.
Third, Montan-codetermination was extended to include more specific rules and
procedures in 1956. This form of codetermination remains the most intrusive in terms of how
it affects the corporate governance of the firm. Only ten companies remained subject to
Montan-codetermination in 1997, compared to 49 in the 1960s.
Finally, under the Codetermination Act of 1976, any corporation that has more than
2,000 employees (and was not already covered by Montan-codetermination) must allow
employees to elect one half of the members of the supervisory board. This law pre-empts the
1952 law. The supervisory board chairman is effectively elected by the shareholders’
representatives and is given an extra vote to break ties, so there is no need for a neutral
member.
The laws governing stock corporations allow individual companies some leeway to
determine which decisions must be approved by the supervisory board. However, some
types of decisions must be ratified by the supervisory board. Thus, workers are guaranteed a
significant voice in the process of corporate decision-making in Germany.34
APPENDIX C: THE THYSSEN-KRUPP MERGER
At the beginning of 1997, Fried. Krupp AG Hoesch-Krupp (“Krupp”) and Thyssen AG
(“Thyssen”) were two of the largest German steel and engineering companies. Krupp was
somewhatsmaller than Thyssen, with total assets of DM 17.8 bn (end-of-fiscal year 1996)
versus DM 25.5 bn for Thyssen (end-of-fiscal year 1995/96). In terms of European industry
rankings, Thyssen was the 1~ largest firm in Europe and Krupp ranked as number 273
(January 22, 1998, Financial Times “European 500” ranking).
The two firms had always been similar in some respects. Since WWII, both
companies had acquired many other German steel-makers to expand their steel-making
capacity. Both firms had transformed their steel divisions into subsidiaries (Krupp Stahl and
Thyssen Stahl) in order to facilitate diversification by the parent company. Finally, both firms
had focused their recent acquisitions on engineering.
These two industrial giants had their differences, as well. In particular, Krupp was the
more forceful in pushing forward its restructuring efforts throughcapital market transactions.
Gerhard Cromme, CEO of Krupp, had gained a reputation in the early 1990s for making
aggressive acquisitions.
In 1991, Cromme announced Krupp’s desire to enter into a close alliance with Hoesch
AG. Krupp backed up Cromme’s ambition by acquiring a 24.9 percent equity stake in
Hoesch. This position had been built up in the course of the year with the help of a Swiss
bank. It had remained unnoticed until Cromme’s announcement because the threshold for
mandatory public disclosure of block holdings in Germany was 25 percent at that time (it was
changed to five percent in 1995; it is also five percent in the U.S.). Deutsche Bank had
installed Kajo Neukirchen as CEO of Hoesch just a few months earlier and was caught by
surprise when Krupp announced its intentions. Despite a 15 percent voting restriction
(ceiling) imposed on any shareholder by Hoesch’s corporate bylaws, Krupp overcame
vigorous resistance by Neukirchen and merged with Hoesch in 1992.35
For several years in the early 1 990s, Gerhard Cromme had tried to find a way to
merge Krupp and Thyssen. However, Cromme was never able to make any headway with
Thyssen’s CEO, Dieter Vogel. In the end, Krupp enlisted Deutsche Bank for one last
takeover attempt— this time a hostile one. The takeover strategy itself was developed by
Goldman Sachs of the U.S. and bore the telling code name “Hammerund Thor.” Financing
was arranged by Deutsche Morgan Grenfell and Kleinwort Benson, London-based investment
bank subsidiaries of Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, respectively.
On March 17, 1997, rumors spread that Krupp would launch a takeover attack on
Thyssen. The next day, Krupp made its intentions public, announcing a tender offer for
Thyssen. Krupp and Thyssen shares were suspended from stock exchange trading as
details were communicated to the market. Thyssen made clear that it did not welcome the
bid and considered the takeover attempt hostile. Infuriated Thyssen workers demonstrated in
front of the Krupp headquarters. Thyssen Stahl, the steel subsidiary, was so disrupted by the
takeover bid that its production was halted.
The state government of North Rhine-Westfalia, home to both companies, announced
that talks on a merger of the steel subsidiaries of Krupp and Thyssen would take place on
March 1 gth In deference to these talks, Krupp suspended its takeover offer for a week.
Thyssen Stahl resumed production, but Krupp workers at plants in Bochum and Dortmund
then went on strike. On March ~ the talks between the CEOs of Krupp and Thyssen
began; Krupp and Thyssen shares began to trade again. Soon thereafter, Krupp workers in
Bochum and Dortmund returned to work. Two days later, the supervisory boards of Krupp
and its steel subsidiary met. On March
24
th Krupp withdrew the takeover offer.
At the end of March, Krupp and Thyssen announced the merger of their steel
subsidiaries into Thyssen Krupp Stahl AG, to become effective April
1
st~This company is
now the largest steel-maker in Europe and the third largest in the world. Krupp CEO Cromme
declared that the (failed) takeover of Thyssen was a sound plan, but that it had become
obsolete due to the merger of the steel subsidiaries. Thyssen CEO Vogel, on the other hand,36
claimed that the takeover plan had always been shaky, and he expressed his satisfaction that
it had failed.
In August of 1997, the public learned that there had been more confidential talks
about a complete merger of Krupp and Thyssen. In mid-September, the surprising results of
these talks emerged. The management boards of both firms had agreed to a complete
merger. The proposed merger received the approval of the supervisory boards of Thyssen
(on January
22
nd 1998) and of Krupp (on February
5
th, 1998) with thin majorities.
Sorting out the details of this megamerger will not be simple. Thyssen was subject to
Montan-codetermination rules (i.e., specific to the coal and steel industries and more
favorable to union representatives) while Krupp was subject to the regular form of equal
representation (with a lesser role for trade unions). All ten worker representatives on the
Thyssen supervisory board voted against the merger and the so-called “neutral member” of
the board broke the tie in favor of merging. On the Krupp supervisory board, one worker
representative voted in favor of the merger. Otherwise, the vote would have been
deadlocked and the chairman would have been forced to use his second vote to break the
tie. The new firm, Thyssen-Krupp AG, is not subject to Montan-codetermination and its
strong trade-union influence. This may be one of the reasons why Thyssen’s unionized
workers resisted the merger so strongly.
In the executive suite, there was a dramatic race for the CEO position of Thyssen-
Krupp AG. The decisive blow to Dieter Vogel’s chances to head the new firm came from
German authorities in December 1997, who filed charges against Vogel for corporate misuse
of government subsidies. A compromise involving two CEO5 was eventually reached.
Gerhard Cromme will be one of the CEOs and Ekkehard Schulz, formerly head of the
Thyssen steel subsidiary, will be the other.
The roles played by Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank in this takeover battle remain
controversial in Germany. When Krupp launched its takeover attempt with the backing of the
banks, the ex-CEO of Dresdner Bank and current chairman of its supervisory board,
Wolfgang RaIler, was a member of Thyssen’s supervisory board. When his board term37
ended at the end of March 1997, he was succeeded by Bernhard Walter, a member of the
Dresdner Bank management board (and now its CEO). Even more delicate was the case of
Ulrich Cartellieri, a member of the management board of Deutsche Bank and simultaneously
a member of the Thyssen supervisory board. As a member of Thyssen’s supervisory board,
he had access to inside information that would have been valuable to Krupp, Deutsche
Bank’s client. As a member of the Deutsche Bank management board, he approved the




Source: “Die Welt”, German Daily, http://www.welt.de38
APPENDIX D: STOCK EXCHANGES IN GERMANY
Germany has eight stock exchanges, among which the Frankfurter Wertpapierborse
(Frankfurt Stock Exchange) is the largest with about 75 percent of total turnover. It is the fifth
largest stock exchange in the world, following the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the
U.S. NASDAQ (over the counter) market, and the London and Tokyo stock markets. In 1996,
its trading volume amounted to 15 percent of the trading volume at the NYSE and to 70
percent of the trading volume in Tokyo. There were 681 firms listed on German stock
exchanges in 1996, togetherwith 123 firms that trade over the counter only. In the U.S.,
there were 2,172 firms listed on the NYSE, 5,167 on the NASDAQ, and 688 on the American
Exchange (HoppenstedtAktienführer 1998, 1997).
A number of laws (Finanzmarkfforderungsgesetze) have been passed in recent years
aimed at improving the competitiveness of Germany as a financial center in Europe
(Finanzplatz Deutschland). The Frankfurter WertpapierbOrse has been transformed into a
stock corporation in which banks (as a group) hold the majority of votes (81 percent as of
November 1996). Insider-trading rules have been tightened and market transparency has
been improved. In the 1997 World Competitiveness Yearbook(International Institute for
Management Development, 1997), Germany ranks above Japan, France, and the U.S. in
terms of its success in preventing insider trading. (For more information about recent
developments affecting German stock exchanges, see http://www.bawe.de.)
There are three main market segments at the Frankfurt stock exchange. The first
segment (Amtlicher Handel) listed 517 domestic firms at the end of 1996 plus 219
international firms (Deutsche Barse, 1996, p. 11). In November 1997, an electronic trading
system for first-segment shares, known as Xetra (Exchange electronic Trading), was
launched. When it is fully operational at the end of 1998, it will have completely eliminated
order books from the trading process. In other words, every buy and sell order will be
matched and the process will be fully transparent to all market participants.39
The second market segment (GeregelterMarkt) has listing requirements less strict
than those in the first segment. It serves mainly as a “launching pad” for young firms. There
were 162 domestic listings and 30 international listings on this market segment at the end of
1996.
The third market segment is the over-the-counter market. There were 123 domestic
and 1,136 international listings on this segment at the end of 1996. Listing requirements are
minimal on this market segment.
Finally, an innovative new trading arena was introduced in March 1997 (Neuer Markt).
This new market is meant to attract smalland medium-sized, innovative companies,
members of the so-called Mittelstand. Its disclosure rules are very strict and resemble U.S.
practices. Firms must publish their financial statements in English, base their prospectuses
on international standards, and accept a takeover code. This new market had 17 listed firms
as of February 1998.
Although all firms that seek a listing on the Neuer Marktmust sign on, there is
currently no mandatory takeover code in Germany. Instead, the takeover code is a voluntary
agreement outlining recommended practices. It was introduced in July 1995, and was
amended and tightened in January 1998 (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 1998). The




The code requires that a bidder make a tender offer for all outstanding shares of the
target once a controlling block in the firm has been acquired. Control is defined as ownership
of more than 50 percent of the voting stock orthe ability to cast at least 75 percent of the
votes at the annual meeting, which may require less than 75 percent of the total shares
outstanding since some shareholders do not vote. Block holdings are posted for public
information at the official website of the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Wertpapierhandel (the
equivalent of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), http://www.bawe.de.40
The voluntary takeover code has met strong resistance from some companies. For
example, BMW, Hoechst, and Volkswagen have refused to sign on because they believe a
large shareholder should not be forced to bid for all of the firm’s outstanding shares when the
purpose of the block holding is to protect specific property rights associated with relation-
specific investments.41
APPENDIX E: MAJOR REFORM PLANS
A topic that has been discussed for many years in Germany is reform of the basic
stock corporation law. The goals of such a reform would be to improve the transparency of
the firm’s ownership structure and to decrease the transaction costs incurred by participants
in the market for corporate control (i.e., takeovers). This endeavor is motivated by the view
that the stock market should play a greater role in the allocation of capital and control rights in
Germany than it has done previously. Implicitly, the aim is to roll back the influence of banks
and to give non-banks a stronger incentive to build blocks (Wenger, 1992). Forthe
Bundeskartellamt (German antitrust agency) perspective on the reform of the stock
corporation law, particularly with respect to restricting the influence of banks, see their
website (http://www.bundeskartellamt.de).
The debate over reform of the stock corporation law has five themes: board
representation, multiple voting rights, voting restrictions, proxy voting, and share repurchases.
• Currently, the maximum number of supervisory board seats any individual is
allowed to hold is ten. The most likely change to this provision is to count the chairmanship
of any supervisory board as the equivalent of two ordinary board seats.
• Most reform plans envision elimination of multiple voting rights (preferred
voting stock). Elimination of shares with multiple votes is consistent with German and
European guidelines that prohibit the issue of new stock with multiple votes. From the point
of view of a firmwith preferred voting stock already outstanding, the cost of issuing new
equity is higher in the presence of this stock. This is because there is an “overhang” of votes
that causes new shares to trade at a discount to the value they would command if they had
full voting power (i.e., a one-share, one-vote ownership structure).
Shares with multiple voting rights are in fact disappearing. For example, RWE
AG will convert its multiple voting stock into ordinary shares in accordance with a shareholder
vote at its February 26, 1998 annual meeting. After years of haggling over this issue with the
VkA (Verband derkommunalen RWE-Aktionäre, or “Association of Local and Regional42
Governmental RWE Shareholders”), the management of RWE— which favored conversion—
finally succeeded in passing such a resolution at the annual meeting. VkA held all of the
outstanding preferred voting stock, each share of which carried 20 votes. As a consequence,
VkA held 30.2 percent of the share capital but controlled 59,5 percent of the votes. To
compensate for the loss of voting power, VkA will be given a one-time cash payment of DM
1.15 bn, which isa rough estimate of the value of the extra voting rights these owners
previously enjoyed (http://www.rwe.de).
• Abandoning voting restrictions would substantially reduce the proxy voting
power of banks. This is because, when there is a voting restriction in place, there is little
incentive for shareholders to build blocks. The fraction of votes a blockholder can exercise is
restricted and proxy voting by banks is unrestricted as long as the shareholders they
represent do not exceed the limit of exercisable votes individually. However, small
blockholders are sometimes able to organize and eliminate voting restrictions. For example,
the voting restriction of Linde AG limited the voting power of each shareholder to ten percent
of total voting stock outstanding. Over time, Commerzbank AG, Deutsche Bank AG, and
Allianz each built blocks of around ten percent. Given the dispersion of the remaining shares,
the joint voting power of these three blockholders was sufficient to eliminate the voting
restriction at the 1997 annual meeeting.
• The most controversial part of reform efforts is the plan to restrict proxy voting
by banks. Currently, any (legal or natural) person is allowed to vote in proxy. A proposed
change is to restrict the use of proxy votes by banks to those firms in which the bank holds at
least five percent of the voting stock. Such a rule would discriminate against banks in their
role as custodians for small shareholders. However, it would not affect proxy voting by bank
executive directors (as natural persons), who occasionally represent blockholders. Small
shareholders would be forced either to let their votes go unexercised, to travel to the annual
meeting, or to transfer their voting rights to other agents such as the Deutsche
Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitze. V. ,an organization dedicated to protecting small
shareholders’ rights (http://www.das-wertpapier.de).43
• Firms are interested in stock repurchases as a means of reducing their cash
holdings; this is often seen as an effective anti-takeover device. Many large German firms
have indicated that they would repurchase shares if it were allowed. Prominent examples
include BASF AG and Schering AG (Die Welt, July 31, 1997).
Schering AG has been rumored to be a takeover candidate for years. The
company has a voting restriction, which also functions as an anti-takeover device. Schering’s
only blockholder is Allianz AG, which holds a ten percent stake. Schering had a very liquid
balance sheet at the end of fiscal 1996, holding liquid assets equal to 20 percent of its
balance sheet total (HoppenstedtAktienführer 1997, 1997). Schering’s CEO, Guiseppe Vita,
has indicated that he would recommend elimination of the firm’s voting restriction to the
shareholders if share repurchases became legal (Die Welt, May 2, 1997).
There is little dispute that phasing out preferred voting stock, eliminating voting
restrictions, and restricting bank proxy voting will all lower the transactions costs associated
with the market for corporate control in Germany. Some costs may be incurred as a result, as
well. Eliminating preferred voting stock will make it harder for an individual or a family to
remain in control of a firm; there may be important private benefits of control that should be
taken into account (Hart, 1995). The same is true of multiple classes of stock with differential
voting rights, stock that is often held by local communities or by the family of the founder.
Restricting bank proxy voting will increase the costs small shareholders face in having their
votes exercised at annual meetings.44
REFERENCES
Aghion, P., and P. Bolton. “An ‘Incomplete Contracts’ Approach to Financial Contracting,”
Review ofEconomic Studies, 59 (1992), 473-494.
Allen, F., and D. Gale, “A Welfare Comparison of Intermediaries and Financial Markets in
Germany and the US,” European Economic Review39 (2), February 1995, 179-209.
Bayerische Landesregierung, “Bericht aus der Kabinettssitzung,” September 18, 1995,
http://www.bayern.de/Politik/Pressemitteilungen/1995MRat/09-1 8.html.
Bahm, J. Der Einflul3 derBanken auf Grof3unternehmen, Hamburg, 1992.
Bundeskartellamt, “Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes über seine Tatigkeit in den Jahren
1995/96 sowie uber die Lage und Entwicklung auf seinem Aufgabengebiet,” 1997,
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/kurztb.htr.
Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Ubernahmekodex der Barsensachverstandigenkommission
beim Ministerium der Finanzen, January 1998.
Bundesverband deutscher Banken, “ Datenbank für Wirtschaftsdaten,” http://www.bdb.de.
Cable, J. “Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance: The Role of West German
Banks,” Economic Journal, 95 (1985), 118-132.
Chandler, A.D. Scaleand Scope: The Dynamics ofIndustrial Capitalism, Cambridge (Mass.),
1990.
Deutsche Borse AG, FactBook 1996, Frankfurt a.M., 1996.
Deutsche Barse AG, Germanyas a Financial Center, Frankfurt a.M., 1997.
Edwards, J. and K. Fischer. Banks, Finance and Investmentin Germany, Cambridge (UK),
1994.
Elston, J.A. and H. Albach. “Bank Affiliationsand Firm Capital Investment in Germany,” ifo-
Studien, 41(1995), 3-16.
Fischer, K. Hausbankbeziehungen als InstrumentderBindungzwischen Banken und
Unternehmen: Eine theoretische und empirischeAnalyse, doctoral thesis, University of Bonn,
1990.
FitzRoy, F.R., and K. Kraft. “Economic Effects of Codetermination,” Scandinavian Journal of
Economics, 95 (1993), 365-375.
Franks, J., and C. Mayer. ‘The Ownership and Control of German Corporations,” The London
Business School, unpublished manuscript, 1994.
Gale, D., and M. Hellwig. “Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem,”
Reviewof EconomicStudies, 52 (1985), 647-663.
Gorton, G., and F.A. Schmid. “Corporate Finance, Control Rights, and Firm Performance: A
Study of German Codetermination,” unpublished manuscript, The University of Pennsylvania,
1998a.45
Gorton, G., and F.A. Schmid. “Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms,”
unpublished manuscript, The University of Pennsylvania, 1 998b.
Gottschalk, A. (1988), “Der StimmrechtseinfluB der Banken in den Aktionarsversammlungen
derGrol3unternehmen,” WSI-Mitteilungen 41, 294-304.
Grossman, S., and 0. Hart, “One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control,”
Journal ofFinancialEconomics 20, Jan./Mar. 1988, 175-202.
Harris, M., and A. Raviv, “Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and Majority Rules,” Journal
ofFinancialEconomics 20, Jan./Mar. 1988, 203-35.
Hart, 0. Firms, Contracts, and FinancialStructure, Oxford (UK), 1995.
Hellwig, M, “Banking, Financial Intermediation and Corporate Finance (with discussion),” in
Giovannini, A., and C. Mayer, eds., European financialintegration (Cambridge, New York and
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 35-72.
Hilferding, R. Das Finanzkapital: Eine Studie überdiejüngste Entwicklung des Kapitalismus,
Berlin, 1910.
HoppenstedtAktienführer 1998, ed. by Verlag Hoppenstedt, Darmstadt, November 1997.
Hoshi, R., A. Kashyap and D. Scharfstein. “The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of
Financial Distress in Japan,” Journal of FinancialEconomics, 27 (1990), 67-88.
International Institute for Management Development, World Competitiveness Yearbook,
Lausanne, 1997.
Jeidels, 0. Das Verhältnis derGrol3banken zurIndustrie mit besondererBerücksichtigungder
Eisenindustrie, Leipzig, 1905.
Jensen, M.C. “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control
Systems,” Journal ofFinance, 48 (1993), 831-880.
Jensen, M.C. and K.J. Murphy. “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives,” Journal
ofPolitical Economy, 98 (1990), 224-264.
Kaplan, S.N. “Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany,” Journal ofLaw,
Economics, and Organization, 10 (1994), 142-159.
Kaplan, S.N., and L. Zingales, “Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful
Measures of Financing Constraints?” QuarterlyJournal ofEconomics 112 (1997), No. 1, pp.
169-21 5.
Körber, U. Die Stimmrechtsvertretung derKreditinstitute, Berlin, 1989.
Kraft, K. “Empirical Studies on Codetermination: A Selective Survey and Research Design,”
Codetermination: A Discussion ofDifferentApproaches, H.G. Nutzinger, and J. Backhaus,
eds., Berlin, 1989, 277-298.
Krümmel, H.-J. (1980) “German Universal Banking Scrutinized: Some Remarks Concerning
the Gessler-Report,” Journal ofBankingand Finance 4, 33-55.46
Manne, H.G. “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,”Journal of Political Economy,
73(1965), 110-120.
Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten 11(1976/77): Fortschreitende Konzentration bei
Grol3unternehmen, Baden-Baden, 1978.
Rajan, R., “Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm’s-Length Debt,”
Journal ofFinance 47(4), September 1992, 1367-400.
Riesser, J. Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte derdeutschen Grol3banken mitbesonderer
Berücksichtigung derKonzentrationsbestrebungen, Jena, 1905.
Schmid, F.A. “Banken, Aktionàrsstruktur und Unternehmenssteuerung,” Kreditund Kapital,
29 (1996a), 402-427, 545-564.
Schmid, F.A. “Beteiligungen deutscher Geschäftsbanken und Corporate Performance,”
Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, 116 (1 996b), 273-310.
Schmid, F.A. and F. Seger “Arbeitnehmermitbestimmung, Allokation von
Entscheidungsrechten und Shareholder Value,” Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, 68 (1998),
forthcoming.
Schneider-Lenné, E.R. “Corporate Control in Germany,” OxfordReviewof Economic Policy, 8
(1992), 11-23.
Schneider-Lenné, E.R. “The Role of the German Capital Markets and the Universal Banks,
Supervisory Boards, and Interlocking Directorships,” in Dimsdale, N, and M. Prevezer, eds.,
Capitalmarkets and Corporate Governance, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 285-305.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 23w’AnnualReport, Washington, GPO, 1958.
Shonfield, A., Modern Capitalism (Oxford University Press), 1965.
Shleifer, A., and L.H. Summers. “Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers (with discussion),”
Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, A.J. Auerbach, ed., Chicago, 1988, 33-
67.
Shleifer, A., and R.W. Vishny, “A Survey of Corporate Governance,” Journalof Finance, 52
(1997), 737-83.
Steinitzer, E. Okonomische Theorie derAktiengesellschaft, Leipzig, 1908.
Studienkommission, Bericht derStudienkommission: Grundsatzfragen derKreditwirtschaft,
Schriftenreihe des Bundesministeriums für Finanzen, Heft 28, Bonn, 1979.
Townsend, R. “Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification,”
Journal of Economic Theoty, 21(1978), 265-293.
Wall Street Journal, WallStreetJournalAlmanac 1998 (New York: Ballantine Books, 1997).
Wenger, E. “Universalbankensystem und Depotstimmrecht (with discussion),” DerMarkt für
Unternehmenskontrollen, H. Graner, ed., Schriften des Vereins für Socialpoiltik, N.F., 124,
Berlin, 1992, 73-118.47
TABLES
Table 1: Votes Cast at Annual Shareholder Meetings as a Percentage of Shares
Outstanding
Company 1975 1980 1986 1990 1994
BASF 65.9 66.2 55.4 52.4 50.9
Bayer 64.9 67.5 52.9 47.2 48.4
Continental 72.9 65.0 35.1 58.7 47.3
Daimler-Benz 93.0 89.7 80.4 78.6 70.8
Hoechst 69.6 66.7 58.3 66.9 71.5
Mannesmann 65.1 63.4 49.6 37.0 45.7
Schering 47.1 58.0 46.6 33.7 36.7
Siemens 72.1 72.1 58.2 49.5 53.9
Thyssen 84.0 79.0 68.5 64.8 68.3
VEBA 80.9 78.3 65.2 51.1 46.2
Volkswagen 58.6 59.9 50.1 34.7 32.9
Source: Bundesverband deutscher Banken (http://www.bdb.de)48
Table 2: Composition of Supervisory Boards of the 100 Largest German Firms
Occupation or affiliation of
board member
1986 1988 1992 1993
Number of board seats
(percent of total seats)
















Active or retired executive of





















































Source: Bundesverband deutscher Banken (http://www.bdb.de)49
Table 3: Largest Blockholders in a Sample of Large German Firms
Number of
firms
Firmswithout any blockholder 9
Firms with a blockholder 189
Total 198
Type of largest blockholder Number of
blocks
Foreign government 1
Not-for-profit organization (Verein) 1
Domestic insurance company 2
Domestic government (including foundations) 11
Domestic bank 16
Foreign nonfinancial company 21
Family (including trusts) 43
Domestic nonfinancial company 96
Total 200*
Size of largest block held by domestic nonfinancial








*Two firms had blockholders of equal size.
Gorton and Schmid (1998a, Table 3); HoppenstedtAktienführer 1994.50
Table 4: Equity Stakes Held by Banks
1986 1989 1994
Number of firms in which banks hold
~quity stakes (includes all corporations)
89 101 135
Fraction of the firm’s outstanding equity
owned by banks (x = all banks’ stake)
Number of firms in which banks
held this equity stake
Dercentage


















Number of traded firms in which banks
hold equity stakes
46 38 30
Fraction of the firm’s outstanding equity
owned by banks (x = all banks’ stake)
Number of firms in which banks
held this equity stake


















Source: Bundesverband deutscher Banken (http://www.bdb.de)51
1. For surveys of corporate governance that focus on or include the United States, see
Jensen (1993) or Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
2. Market makers will be eliminated from the first segment of the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange when the electronic trading system, Xetra, is fully implemented.
3. Karl Marx, among many others, was heavily influenced by Hegel’s views on history
and society.
4. Banks are legally entitled to deviate from the announced voting behavior if new
relevant information arrives between the contact with the shareholders and the annual
meeting. The legal rules for this discretionary behavior are very strict, however.
5. The Volkswagen AG voting restrictions differ from any other voting restrictions
subsequently adopted by German stock corporations in two respects. First, the
Volkswagen voting restrictions were established by law (the Volkswagen Privatization
Act of 1960). Second, the restrictions apply not only to votes based on equity positions
but also to proxy votes. This implies that there is an upper limit to the fraction of total
voting stock a bank can represent at the annual meeting even if the votes a bank
exercises in proxy are from smallshareholders.
6. The two cases are Feldmühle Nobel AG (acquired by Stora Kopparberg Bergslags
AB of Sweden) and Hoesch AG (acquired by Fried. Krupp GmbH). Feldmühle had a five
percent voting restriction, while the limit for Hoesch was 15 percent. For details on these
cases see Franks and Mayer (1994). For more details on the Hoesch-Krupp takeover,
see the text below and Box 3. Schneider-Lenné (1994, p. 301) notes that Continental
AG’s voting restriction hindered Pirelli and its allies in their quest to take over Continental
in 1990.
7. Prior to 1995, the threshhold for mandatory disclosure of a block shareholding in
Germanywas 25 percent. Spurred by efforts to harmonize European financial
regulations, Germany adopted tighter disclosure thresholds beginning January
1
st, 1995.52
Investors must now disclose any purchases of stock that cause their stake in a firm to
exceed 5, 10, 25, 50, or 75 percent of the total stock issued.
8. Information on bank equity positions in traded stock corporations is now easily
accessible. The German equivalent of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel (BAWe), publishes this data
on the Internet(http://www.bawe.de). For nontraded firms such as companies organized
as GmbHs, ownershipdata are sparse.
9. These numbers should be viewed skeptically, however, because they are the least
comprehensive of three measures of equity: face value, book value, and market value.
Face value is also known as par value; it is the nominal value of the shares at issue.
Book value includes face value plus reserves that have been added over time through
paid-in surplus and retained earnings. Market value is, of course, the number of shares
outstanding times the market price per share at any given time. This last measure of the
value of the firm’s equity is likely to be the most meaningful for most purposes.
10. For details on two successful hostile takeovers, see Franks and Mayer (1994).
They also give details on the unsuccessful attempt of Pirelli, an Italian tire-maker, to take
over its German competitor, Continental AG. Another hostile takeover attempt that failed
was made by Hochtief AG, a construction company. In a joint effort with Deutsche Bank,
Hochtief acquired a majority stake in Philipp Holzmann AG, another construction
company. Deutsche Bank and Hochtief announced in March 1997 that they would ask
the European Commissioner for competition policy, Karel van Miert, for approval to pool
their equity stakes. This was an attempt to evadethe German antitrust agency
(Bundeskartellamt~, which opposed the takeover. The request was submitted in April but
was withdrawn in June after Deutsche Bank and Hochtief were notified that the
European Commission lacked standing to rule on the matter.
11. The decline of the fraction of stock directly owned by households may also be due
simply to organizational changes at the firm level. Suppose there is only one stock
corporation in the economy, the equity of which is owned by households. The value of53
the firm’s equity is 100 DM. The firm then decides to adopt a new structure with a
holding company at the top and a one hundred percent-owned subsidiary at the bottom.
Households receive DM 100 worth of equity in the holding company, while the holding
company owns the shares of the subsidiary, also worth DM 100. Thus, the household’s
ownership share of total stock outstanding has fallen from 100 percent to 50 percent.
But of course, nothing fundamental has changed. In fact, many of the largest firms have
recently moved toward a holding company structure, including Daimler-Benz AG and
Hoechst AG.
12. Franks and Mayer (1994) illustrate the practice of pyramiding in Germany with the
case of Mercedes Holding AG. This holding company served as “firm B” in the scheme
outlined in the text to allow a few large German investors (“firm A”) to maintain control
over Daimler-Benz AG (“firm C”) despite investing less than a majority of the capital in
the target firm. It should be noted that the case of Mercedes Holding AG is atypical in
some respects, however. The holding company was set up in 1975 with the
encouragement of government officials as an anti-takeover device when it appeared that
oil-rich investors from the Middle East might attempt to gain control over some of the
“crown jewels” of German industry in the wake of very low stock prices. Mercedes
Holding AG was dissolved in 1994.
13. For example, there is an extensive literature in Germany debating the “power of the
banks,” ranging from more or less well informed contributions in the popular press to
well-researched publications in academic journals.
14. Apparently misled by its name, the authors classified Holderbank Financiere as a
bank. In fact, Holderbank is a cement group. Its name is taken from the town of
Holderbank, located in the Swiss canton of Aargau, where the company was founded in
1912 (http:llwww.holderbank.com).
15. Given that the marginal return on corporate control is decreasing and the marginal
costs are non-decreasing, the actual level of monitoring exerted by the bank will be too
low from the standpoint of maximizing the wealth of all shareholders.54
16. This relationship is consistent with a U-shaped relationship between ROE and bank
equity ownership because the total return on assets is a weighted sum of the interest
rate on debt and the return to equity. The weights are the fractions of debt and equity in
total assets, respectively. These weights may adjust as the size of the bank’s block
changes.
17. Kraft (1989) reviews earlier work that was flawed by unreliable datasets and
inappropriate empirical methods.
18. If 13 is the regression coefficient in a semi-logarithmic model, then the percentage
change of the dependent variable as a result of a switch of the dummy variable from zero
to one is given by lOOx(e8-1) (Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980). Using the regression
coefficients displayed in Table 2 of FitzRoy and Kraft (1993), the 19.7 percent reduction
in value added can be calculated as follows: (e°13-1)-(e°°6-1)=0.197.
19. These finding are not directly comparable to the U.S. results presented by Jensen
and Murphy (1990). This is because Jensen and Murphy used “first differences” instead
of logarithmic values in their regressions. They found that CEO wealth changes by $3.25
for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth.